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In this paper, I consider the conception of well-being1 in Hume’s moral philosophy. It is
not unusual now for Hume to be read as a kind of virtue ethicist, in which case, we may
have a problem in specifying what kind of virtue ethicist (or theorist) Hume is. Indeed,
there are some earlier works that address this problem. However, they do not discuss how
Hume conceives of the relation between our well-being and the virtues. Hence, it is unclear
whether the virtues, in Hume’s thought, are necessary or/and suﬃcient conditions for our
well-being.
I consider this relation and claim that, in Hume’s thought, some kind of virtue is a
necessary condition for our well-being, since such virtue benefits its possessors and his
fellows. It is not, however, suﬃcient. According to Hume, the satisfactory review of one’s
own conduct is requisite for our well-being. Another kind of virtue, upon which immediate
agreeable feelings attend, enables us to undertake this review. Therefore, in Hume’ moral
philosophy, if we want to attain the happy life – that is, well-being – we have to acquire not
only the former kind of virtue but the latter.
1 In this paper, I treat the following words as equivalent: well-being, happiness, the good of human beings,




In this paper, I consider the conception of well-being in Hume’s moral philosophy. In
particular, I will consider how Hume thinks of the relation between our well-being and the
virtues.
It is not unusual now for Hume to be read as a kind of virtue ethicist, in which case,
we may have a problem in specifying what kind of virtue ethicist (or theorist) Hume is.
Indeed, there are some earlier works that address this problem. For instance, Christine
Swanton argues that Hume should be understood as part of a virtue ethical tradition which is
sentimentalist in a response-dependent sense (Swanton [2007, 2009], also see Baier [2009]).
And also, Michael Slote regards Hume as a sort of virtue ethicist who focuses attention on
“empathy (sympathy)” (Slote [2010]). However, they do not consider Hume’s conception
of the relation between our well-being and the virtues. It is unclear, therefore, whether,
and which, virtues, in Hume’s thought, are necessary or/and suﬃcient conditions for our
well-being.
On first glance, it might seem as if Hume does not discuss the relation. However, as I
argue below, there are some explanations of it in Hume’s writing. In this paper, I consider
Hume’s position on the relation between our well-being and the virtues. Firstly, I develop
a conception of Hume as a kind of virtue ethicist by attending to his discussion of “general
points of view”. Secondly, I consider the problem of whether, and which, virtues, in Hume’s
thought, are necessary or/and suﬃcient conditions for our well-being. Thirdly, I provide my
own interpretation that, in Hume’s thought, some kind of virtue is a necessary condition for
our well-being. This is not, however, suﬃcient for us to live a happy life. According to
Hume, the satisfactory review of one’s own conduct is requisite for our well-being. As
I demonstrate, another kind of virtue, upon which immediate agreeable feelings attend,
enables us to do this review. Finally, therefore, I insist that, in Hume’ moral philosophy, if
we want to attain a happy life, we have to acquire not only the former kind of virtue but also
the latter.
Hume as a sort of virtue ethicist
Jacqueline Taylor argues that ‘Hume’s moral philosophy may plausibly be construed as a
version of virtue ethics,’ because ‘among the central concepts of his theory are character,
virtue and vice, rather than rules, duty, and obligation’ (Taylor [2006] p. 276). I agree
Hume on well-being 47
with her and, in what follows, I provide independent support for her contention through
considering the role that, the notion of “the general points of view” (hereafter GPV) plays
in Hume’s moral theory.
Traditionally, Hume’s GPV is interpreted as some kind of moral point of view (Radcliﬀe
[1994], Korsgaard [1999]). According to the traditional view, we cannot experience the
moral sentiments or have moral concepts unless we have already taken up GPV. It is only by
taking up GPV that we come to be able to judge whether some action is right or wrong (e.g,,
Brown and Morris [2012] pp. 130–131). On this traditional view, when we make a moral
judgment, we have to take up GPV; also GPV may be regarded as a device for evaluating
some action or for reconciling some moral conflicts. However, this interpretation fails to
apprehend, not only the role GPV plays, but also the context in which GPV appears.
In the first place, what perspective is GPV? Hume’s first explanation of it is as follows:
Our situation, with regard both to persons and things, is in continual fluctuation;
and a man, that lies at a distance from us, may, in a little time, become a
familiar acquaintance. Besides, every particular man has a peculiar position
with regard to others; and ‘tis impossible we cou’d ever converse together on
any reasonable terms, were each of us to consider characters and persons, only
as they appear from his peculiar point of view. In order, therefore, to prevent
those continual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things,
we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts,
place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation. (T 3.3.1.15,
original italics.)
This explanation describes how we come to take up GPV. However, this explanation is
incomplete, because, from this quotation, we have no idea exactly what perspective, or
whose, we have to take in the moral evaluation. It must therefore be made clear what
constitutes GPV and whose perspective it is.
In A Treatise of Human Nature, Part III, Section 3, explaining goodness and benevo-
lence, Hume argues about GPV more precisely. In this section, Hume rephrases GPV as
“the only point of view”, in which our moral sentiments concur with those of others. Hume
says,
Being thus acquainted with the nature of man, we expect not any impossibili-
ties from him; but confine our view to that narrow circle, in which any person
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moves, in order to form a judgment of his moral character. When the natu-
ral tendency of his passions leads him to be serviceable and useful within his
sphere, we approve of his character, and love his person, by a sympathy with
the sentiments of those, who have a more particular connexion with him. (T
3.3.3.2)
According to Hume, whenever we judge someone’s moral character, we focus on (or we
should focus on) their narrow circle. Their narrow circle is the sphere in which, typically,
their family, friends, neighbors, co-workers, and so on, live with them. In contrast with
this “narrow” circle, the range of the sphere can be extended to the person’s native country
(Ibid.). Since those in the narrow circle have a closer connection with them than anyone
else, they therefore are well-acquainted with the agent’s character traits. Thus, they are the
appropriate objects on which we focus when considering whether the character traits of the
agent are virtuous or vicious.
Hence, in my (perhaps unorthodox) interpretation, Hume’s GPV is the perspective
which the persons in the narrow circle take. In Adam Smith’s moral philosophy, on the
other hand, the moral point of view is that of “impartial spectators”. The traditional view
regards Hume’s GPV as something like the perspective of impartial spectators. This view
insists that ‘the general point of view, [...] brings a kind of impartiality to our moral judg-
ments.’ (Brown and Morris [2012] p. 131, my emphasis.)
I disagree with this view, and insist that, in contrast with Smith’s view, the perspective
which is involved with moral evaluation is, in Hume’s moral philosophy, that of “partial
spectators”, in contrast with the meaning of the word “general” in “the general points of
view”. GPV is only the perspective in which we can know the character of the relevant
agent. Hume’s moral philosophy seldom addresses the problem of whether some action
is right or wrong. Rather, it considers what kind of person does such an action, in other
words, whether the person who does such an action is virtuous or vicious. Hence, even if
we take up GVP, we cannot know what we should do when faced with a moral dilemma,
and also we cannot judge whether some action (e.g., getting an abortion) is right or wrong.
In taking up GPV, we can merely know someone’s character. This suggests that Hume’s
moral philosophy is a kind of virtue ethics, and Hume is a sort of virtue ethicist, if virtue
ethics is understood as mainly focusing on someone’s character rather than their action.
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Justice as a means to attain the happiness
Traditionally, Hume’s moral theory is interpreted as a sort of Contractarianism, or a pre-
cursor of Utilitarianism. (Cf., Gauthier [1979], Rosen [2003]) However, as argued above,
Hume can be regarded as a kind of virtue ethicist. The question remains as to what Hume
thinks about our well-being and, therefore, about human happiness. In this section, I con-
sider Hume’s conception of our well-being and, in particular, of the relation between our
well-being and the virtues.
In the majority of Book3 of his Treatise, “Of Morals”, Hume argues about justice. Jus-
tice is one of the artificial virtues that, by means of an artifice or a contrivance, arise from
the circumstances and necessity of human beings (T 3.2.1.1). Justice involves, in essence,
the following three rules (or laws): the stability of possession, the transference of property
by consent, and the performance of promises (T 3.2.6.1). By the standard virtue ethical
formula, a just person has the disposition or character trait to observe these rules.
Hume explains that justice is a moral virtue, because it has the tendency to promote the
good of human beings (T 3.3.1.9). In An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, he
gives a similar explanation:
The use and tendency of that virtue [justice] is to procure happiness and secu-
rity, by preserving order in society. (EPM 3.8)
Justice is not only useful, according to Hume, but also absolutely necessary to human soci-
ety. He claims that,
‘Tis on the strict observance of those three laws, that the peace and security
of human society entirely depend; nor is there any possibility of establishing a
good correspondence among men, where these are neglected. Society is abso-
lutely necessary for the well-being of men; and these are as necessary to the
support of society. (T 3.2.6.1, my emphasis.)
Since justice has the tendency to increase our well-being, justice is a moral virtue. It is also
requisite to our well-being because it is the means by which we can maintain society, which
is necessary to our well-being and subsistence (T 3.2.2.9). Hence, justice, as a moral virtue,
is the necessary condition for our well-being in Hume’s thought.
Justice is both useful and requisite to the well-being of human beings. However, it is
not only justice that has the tendency to increase the good of human beings. Many natural
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virtues, Hume claims, also have the same tendency. For example, beneficence, charity,
generosity, and clemency; these have the same tendency to increase the good of human
beings and Hume calls these (including justice) ‘social virtues’ (T 3.3.1.11).
However, in contrast to justice, Hume does not say that those kinds of natural virtues are
requisite for our well-being. Indeed, Hume says, all virtues are considered as means to some
evaluated ends (T 3.3.6.2), and that, all virtues never fail to benefit their possessor or his
fellows (EPM 9.15). However, Hume gives no argument for the claim that the acquisition
of these natural virtues is a necessary condition for our well-being. I now turn to addressing
whether justice is the only necessary condition for our well-being.
Another necessary condition for happiness
According to Hume, justice is useful for us, because it is only through the virtue of justice
that we can maintain our society which provides much fortune (i.e., goods) for us. Thus,
justice is regarded as a necessary condition for our well-being. Hence, we might conclude
that it is possible for us to live a happy life, in so far as we acquire the tendency to observe
the rules of justice.
However, this is not suﬃcient for attaining happiness. In the first place, justice is merely
the means to some end and the end, in this case, is the acquisition of fortune. Then, it may
be supposed that, if we, in some cases, can acquire more fortune by exercising some vices
(for example, iniquity or infidelity) than by following the rules of justice, then justice will
be not regarded as necessary to our well-being. This objection is, famously, illustrated by
the sensible knave, who is a sort of free rider (EPM 9.22).
Against this objection, Hume provides an answer, and in his answer, we can find another
important role which some virtues have in leading us to a happy life. Hume’s answer is that
having some virtues is itself the path to our well-being. Hume says,
Inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review of our
own conduct; these are circumstances, very requisite to happiness” (EPM 9.23,
my emphasis.).
Hume’s argument about what enables us to engage in this satisfactory review is as follows:
Now if life, without passion, must be altogether insipid and tiresome; let a man
suppose that he has full power of modelling his own disposition, and let him
Hume on well-being 51
deliberate what appetite or desire he would choose for the foundation of his
happiness and enjoyment. Every aﬀection, he would observe, when gratified
by success, gives a satisfaction proportioned to its force and violence; but be-
sides this advantage, common to all, the immediate feeling of benevolence and
friendship, humanity and kindness, is sweet, smooth, tender, and agreeable,
independent of all fortune and accidents. These virtues are besides attended
with a pleasing consciousness or remembrance, and keep us in humour with
ourselves as well as others; while we retain the agreeable reflection of having
done our part towards mankind and society. (EPM 9.21, my emphasis.)
According to Hume, we can neither attain the happy life only with the virtue of justice nor
only with fortune. In this respect, Hume explains ironically,
... who can think any advantages of fortune a suﬃcient compensation for the
least breach of the social virtues, when he considers, that not only his character
with regard to others, but also his peace and inward satisfaction entirely depend
upon his strict observance of them; and that a mind will never be able to bear
its own survey, that has’ been wanting in its part to mankind and society ? (T
3.3.6.6)
In order to be happy, we have to acquire the virtue of justice and some fortune, but these are
not suﬃcient. We also have to cultivate certain kinds of natural virtues, such as benevolence,
friendship, humanity, and kindness. By virtue of these natural virtues, we can get a satisfac-
tory review of our own conduct. Hence, not only justice, but also those virtues which enable
us to retain this agreeable reflection are necessary conditions for our well-being. This is,
Hume says, the just notion of the happiness (T 3.3.6.6).
Here, I want to point out two important qualifications. Firstly, I am not suggesting
that, in Hume’s moral theory, all virtues are necessary conditions for happiness. I am only
claiming that, at least, justice and certain natural virtues are. This conception of the relation
between the virtues and our well-being is diﬀerent from that of other virtue ethicists. For
example, John McDowell and Rosalind Hursthouse think that all virtues are necessary for
eudaimonia (McDowell [1979]; Hursthouse [1999]). In contrast, Hume makes no such
claim.
Secondly, it should be noted that, Hume does not think that the sensible knave can be
convinced by appealing to the just notion of the happiness. Hume seems to think, like Hurst-
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house, that our ethical outlook and that of sensible knaves (Hursthouse’s ‘immoralists’) are
diﬀerent and that there is no neutral point of view to convince both. That is why, in replying
to the sensible knave, Hume pessimistically says
I must confess that, if a man think that this reasoning much requires an answer,
it would be a little diﬃcult to find any which will to him appear satisfactory
and convincing. If his heart rebel not against such pernicious maxims, if he
feel no reluctance to the thoughts of villainy or baseness, he has indeed lost a
considerable motive to virtue... (EPM 9.23)
Concluding remarks
In this paper, I identified Hume as a kind of virtue ethicist and then considered what Hume
thinks of the relation between our well-being and the virtues. Justice is the important moral
virtue for us to maintain our society and thereby to benefit its possessors. Having justice
is one of the necessary conditions for our well-being, but it is not suﬃcient. In order to
be happy, we must also cultivate certain natural virtues. Since these natural virtues make
it possible for us to review our own conduct in an agreeable manner, having these natural
virtues is another necessary condition for our well-being.
I have, therefore, established Hume’s conception of the relation between our well-being
and the virtues. There remain some problems with this conception. For instance, McDowell
and Hursthouse think that all virtues are necessary for eudaimonia, but Hume does not
think so. The question is which conception makes more sense for virtue ethics. I leave this
problem for another occasion.
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